This book explores the culture of deference by the legislative branch to the executive branch
on foreign policy issues particularly regarding the George W. Bush administration's rush to
war in Iraq in 2003. By authorizing President Bush to go to war in Iraq at his own discretion
in its October 2002 resolution the 107th Congress abdicated its constitutional responsibility
and its members failed to honor their oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States.
Although the war powers are constitutionally those of Congress historically presidents have
engaged in war making and Congress has with limited success attempted to curb such war making.
This book traces how this culture of deference to the chief executive on war making evolved and
how especially in the case of Iraq it has adversely affected the interests of the nation its
constitutional framework and its position in the world. This book will serve as an excellent
text for courses on U.S. foreign policy U.S. diplomatic history and the role of Congress.
