This book presents a theory of the self whose core principle is that the consciousness of the
self is a process of self-representing that runs throughout our life. This process aims
primarily at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical
inconsistence. In other words the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres
whose outcome is self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the
human subject. This picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative
approaches widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach this
book contends that rather than the self being primitive and logically prior it is the result
of a process of construction that originates in subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other
hand it also rejects the anti-realistic eliminative argument that from the non-primary
derivative nature of the self infers its status as an illusory by-product of real
neurobiological events devoid of any explanatory role.
