The concept of convention has been used in different fields and from different perspectives to
account for important social phenomena and the legal sphere is no exception. Rather
reflection on whether the legal phenomenon is based on a convention and if so what kind of
convention is involved has become a recurring issue in contemporary legal theory. In this book
some of the foremost specialists in the field make significant contributions to this debate. In
the first part the concept of convention is analysed. The second part reflects on whether the
rule of recognition postulated by Hart can be understood as a convention and discusses its
potential and limitations in order to explain the institutional and normative character of law.
Lastly the third part critically examines the relations between conventionalism and legal
interpretation. Given the content and quality of the contributions the book is of interest to
those wanting to understand the current state of the art inlegal conventionalism as well as
those wanting to deepen their knowledge about these questions.
