Morality has traditionally been understood to be tied to certain metaphysical beliefs: notably
in the freedom of human persons (to choose right or wrong courses of action) in a god (or
gods) who serve(s) as judge(s) of moral character and in an afterlife as the locus of a final
judgment on individual behavior. Some scholars read the history of moral philosophy as a
gradual disentangling of our moral commitments from such beliefs. Kant is often given an
important place in their narratives despite the fact that Kant himself asserts that some of
such beliefs are necessary (necessary at least from the practical point of view). Many
contemporary neo-Kantian moral philosophers have embraced these disentangling narratives or at
any rate have minimized the connection of Kant s practical philosophy with controversial
metaphysical commitments even with Kant s transcendental idealism. This volume re-evaluates
those interpretations. It is arguably the first collection to systematically explore the
metaphysical commitments central to Kant s practical philosophy and thus the connections
between Kantian ethics his philosophy of religion and his epistemological claims concerning
our knowledge of the supersensible.
