How can we explain our capacity to think about particulars in our external environment? Many
philosophers have answered this question in terms of a sophisticated conception of space and
time and the movement of objects therein. A more recent reaction against this view sought to
explain this capacity solely in terms of perceptual mechanisms of object individuation. Neither
explanation remains fully satisfactory.This book argues for a more desirable middle ground in
terms of a pragmatist approach to demonstrative thought where this capacity is explained
through graded practical knowledge of objects.This view allows us to do justice to important
insights put forward by both positions criticized in the book while avoiding their potential
shortcomings. It also paves the way to a more pragmatist approach to the theory of mental
representation where the notion of practical knowledge is allowed to play a central role in
our cognitive life. Finally it shows how practical knowledge may be firmly rooted in
neurobiological processes and mechanisms that conform to what the empirical sciences tell us
about the mind.
