The present book is the first to undertake a systematic study of Peirce's conception of
historical knowledge and of its value for philosophy. It does so by both reconstructing in
detail Peirce's arguments and giving a detailed account of the many ways in which history
becomes an object of explicit reflection in his writings. The book's leading idea may be stated
as follows: Peirce manages to put together an exceptionally compelling argument about history's
bearing on philosophy not so much because he derives it from a well-articulated and polished
conception of the relation between the two disciplines but on the contrary because he holds
on to this relation while intuiting that it can easily turn into a conflict. This potential
conflict acts therefore as a spur to put forth an unusually profound and multi-faceted analysis
of what it means for philosophy to rely on historical arguments. Peirce looks at history as a
way to render philosophical investigations more detailed more concrete and more sensitive to
the infinite and unforeseeable nuances that characterize human experience. In this way he
provides us with an exceptionally valuable contribution to a question that has remained gravely
under-theorized in contemporary debates.
