The debate between moral realism and antirealism plays an important role in contemporary
metaethics as well as in the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. This volume aims to
clarify whether and in what sense Kant is a moral realist an antirealist or something
in-between. Based on an explication of the key metaethical terms internationally recognized
Kant scholars discuss the question of how Kant's moral philosophy should be understood in this
regard. All camps in the metaethical field have their inhabitants: Some contributors read
Kant's philosophy in terms of a more or less robust moral realism objectivism or idealism
and some of them take it to be a version of constructivism constitutionism or brute
antirealism. In any case all authors introduce and defend their terminology in a clear manner
and argue thoughtfully and refreshingly for their positions. With contributions of Stefano
Bacin Jochen Bojanowski Christoph Horn Patrick Kain Lara Ostaric Fred Rauscher Oliver
Sensen Elke Schmidt Dieter Schönecker and Melissa Zinkin.
