Much attention has been paid to Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism and to Cavell's treatment
of skepticism. But comparatively little has been made of the striking connections between the
early Wittgenstein's view on the truth of solipsism and Cavell's view on the truth of
skepticism and how that relates to the claim that the later Wittgenstein sees privacy as a
constant human possibility. This book offers close readings of representative writings by both
authors and argues that an adequate understanding of solipsism and skepticism requires taking
into account a set of underlying difficulties related to a disappointment with finitude which
might ultimately lead to the threat of solipsism. That threat is further interpreted as a wish
not to bear the burden of having to constantly negotiate and nurture the fragile connections
with the world and others which are the conditions of possibility for finite beings to achieve
meaning and community. By presenting Wittgenstein's and Cavell's responses in an order which
reflects the chronology of their writings the result is a cohesive articulation of some
under-appreciated aspects of their philosophical methodologies which has the potential of
reorienting our entire reading of their work.
