One the most interesting debates in moral philosophy revolves around the significance of
empirical moral psychology for moral philosophy. Genealogical arguments that rely on empirical
findings about the origins of moral beliefs so-called debunking arguments take center stage
in this debate. Looking at debunking arguments based on evidence from evolutionary moral
psychology experimental ethics and neuroscience this book explores what ethicists can learn
from the science of morality and what they cannot. Among other things the book offers a new
take on the deontology utilitarianism debate discusses the usefulness of experiments in ethics
investigates whether morality should be thought of as a problem-solving device shows how
debunking arguments can tell us something about the structure of philosophical debate and
argues that debunking arguments lead to both moral and prudential skepticism. Presenting a new
picture of the relationship between empirical moral psychology and moral philosophy this book
is essential reading for moral philosophers and moral psychologists alike.
