In this volume the philosophy of perception and observation is discussed by leading
philosophers with implications in the philosophy of mind in epistemology and in philosophy of
science. In the last years the philosophy of perception underwent substantial changes and new
views appeared: the intentionality of perception has been contested by relational theories of
perception (direct realism) a richer view of perceptual content has emerged new theories of
intentionality have been defended against naturalistic theories of representation (e. g.
phenomenal intentionality). These theoretical changes reflect also new insights coming from
psychological theories of perception. These changes have substantial consequences for the
epistemic role of perception and for its role in scientific observation. In the present volume
leading philosophers of perception discuss these new views and show their implications in the
philosophy of mind in epistemology and in philosophy of science. A special focus is laid on
Franz Brentano and Ludwig Wittgenstein. A reference volume for all scholars and students of the
history psychology and philosophy of perception and cognitive science.
