To understand many of our everyday joint actions we need a theory of skillful joint action. In
everyday contexts we do numerous things together. Philosophers of collective intentionality
have wondered how we can distinguish parallel cases from cases where we act together. Often
their theories argue in favor of one characteristic feature or function that differentiates
the two. This feature then distinguishes parallel actions from joint action. The approach in
this book is different. Three claims are developed: (1) There are several functions that help
human agents coordinate and act together. (2) This entails that joint action should be
understood through these different interrelated types of coordination. (3) A multidimensional
conceptual space with three levels of control and coordination will allow us to connect these
different forms of coordination and their interdependencies. This allows us to understand the
jointness of an action in a more differentiated and encompassing way. This approach has
ramifications for several distinctions that are typically understood to be binary including
those between action and mere bodily movement joint action and parallel action and action
together and not together.
