This volume provides new insights on lying and (intentionally) misleading in and out of the
courtroom a timely topic for scholarship and society. Not all deceptive statements are lies
not every lie under oath amounts to perjury-but what are the relevant criteria? Taxonomies of
falsehood based on illocutionary force utterance context and speakers' intentions have been
debated by linguists moral philosophers social psychologists and cognitive scientists. Legal
scholars have examined the boundary between actual perjury and garden-variety lies. The
fourteen previously unpublished essays in this book apply theoretical and empirical tools to
delineate the landscape of falsehood half-truth perjury and verbal manipulation including
puffery bluffing and bullshit. The papers in this collection address conceptual and ethical
aspects of lying vs. misleading and the correlation of this opposition with the Gricean
pragmatic distinction between what is said and what is implicated. The questions of truth and
lies addressed in this volume have long engaged the attention of scholars in linguistics
philosophy psychology cognitive science organizational research and the law and
researchers from all these fields will find this book of interest.