Hannah Arendt's claim that she brings Immanuel Kant's unwritten political philosophy to
fruition is controversial. For one it is inconsistent with Kant's thought as he separates
aesthetic and political judgments. Moreover Arendt's appropriation of reflective judgment
conflicts with her sharp distinction between the public and private realms. Whereas reflective
judgment is a reflective ability political judgment is a public ability. This book justifies
Arendt's claim that reflective judgment has political potential - while remaining consistent
with Kant's aesthetics and Arendt's politics. By developing an Arendtian phenomenology of
privacy I offer a new reading of her public-private distinction. I uncover non-privacy as the
space of withdrawal where the life of the mind unfolds. What is more I show that reflective
activities constitute the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of the
public realm. Reflective judgment is one of these activities. For Arendt attributes to enlarged
mentality the public communicability of political judgments. Enlarged mentality thus gives
persons the ability to insert themselves into the world. Therefore Arendt is right to locate
political potential in reflective judgment.
