This volume critically discusses the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. It
does so with a view to respond to objections raised by legal and political philosophers who are
sceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial review is an undemocratic
institution. The book builds on earlier literature on the moral justification of the authority
of constitutional courts and on the current attempts to develop a system on weak judicial
review. Although different in their approach the chapters all focus on devising institutions
procedures and in a more abstract way normative conceptions to democratize constitutional
law. These democratizing strategies may vary from a radical objection to the institution of
judicial review to a more modest proposal to justify the authority of constitutional courts in
their deliberative performance or to create constitutional juries that may be more aware of a
community's constitutional morality than constitutional courts are. The book connects abstract
theoretical discussions about the moral justification of constitutionalism with concrete
problems such as the relation between constitutional adjudication and deliberative democracy
the legitimacy of judicial review in international institutions the need to create new
institutions to democratize constitutionalism the connections between philosophical
conceptions and constitutional practices the judicial review of constitutional amendments and
the criticism on strong judicial review.
