This open access book answers two central questions: firstly is it at all possible to verify
electronic equipment procured from untrusted vendors? Secondly can I build trust into my
products in such a way that I support verification by untrusting customers? In separate
chapters the book takes readers through the state of the art in fields of computer science that
can shed light on these questions. In a concluding chapter it discusses realistic ways forward.
In discussions on cyber security there is a tacit assumption that the manufacturer of
equipment will collaborate with the user of the equipment to stop third-party wrongdoers. The
Snowden files and recent deliberations on the use of Chinese equipment in the critical
infrastructures of western countries have changed this. The discourse in both cases revolves
around what malevolent manufacturers can do to harm their own customers and the importance of
the matter is on par with questions of national security. This book is of great interest to ICT
and security professionals who need a clear understanding of the two questions posed in the
subtitle and to decision-makers in industry national bodies and nation states.
