This book contains twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on
metaepistemology that is on the nature existence and authority of epistemic facts. One of
the central divides in metaepistemology is between epistemic realists and epistemic
anti-realists. Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts (such as the fact that you ought
to believe what your evidence supports) exist independently of human judgements and practices
and that they have authority over our judgements and practices. Epistemic anti-realists think
that if epistemic facts exist at all they are grounded in human judgements and practices and
gain any authority they have from our judgements and practices. This book considers both
epistemic realist and anti-realist perspectives as well as perspectives that 'transcend' the
realism anti-realism dichotomy. As such it constitutes the 'state of the art' with regard to
metaepistemology and will shape the debate in years to come.
