In this book the author shows that it is necessary to enrich the conceptual frame of the
theory of rational choice beyond consequentialism. He argues that consequentialism as a general
theory of rational action fails and that this does not force us into the dichotomy teleology vs
deontology. The unity of practical reason can be saved without consequentialism. In the process
he presents insightful criticism of standard models of action and rational choice. This will
help readers discover a new perspective on the theory of rationality. The approach is radical:
It transcends the reductive narrowness of instrumental rationality without denying its
practical impact. Actions do exist that are outlined in accordance to utility maximizing or
even self-interest maximizing. Yet not all actions are to be understood in these terms.
Actions oriented around social roles for example cannot count as irrational only because
there is no known underlying maximizing heuristic. The concept of bounded rationality tries to
embed instrumental rationality into a form of life to highlight limits of our cognitive
capabilities and selective perceptions. However the agent is still left within the realm of
cost-benefit-reasoning. The idea of social preferences or meta-preferences cannot encompass the
plurality of human actions. According to the author they ignore the plurality of reasons that
drive agency. Hence they coerce agency in fitting into a theory that undermines humanity. His
theory of structural rationality acknowledges lifeworld patterns of interaction and meaning.
