This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self- knowledge
the self-interpretation it embeds and its narrative structure. Bringing together current
research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation the book focuses on
third-person self-knowledge and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring
it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of
investigation in its own right and makes clear the relation between third-person
self-knowledge self-interpretation and narrative capacities. In recent years the idea that
each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has
come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of
what philosophers call ¿first person self-knowledge¿ i.e. knowledge about our mental states
that is often thought to be immediate transparent and authoritative. This line of thought has
led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be ¿first-person self-knowledge¿ is really
just ¿third-person self-knowledge ¿ i.e. knowledge about our mental states that is inferential
opaque and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores
the true nature of third-person knowledge.
