This study is part of a larger project on the primacy of adequacy in the philosophical thought
of Duns Scotus. It offers together with a critical edition the first attempt at an overall
interpretation of the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus - a text famous for
its enhancement of Scotus's conception of metaphysics with the systematic distinction between
metaphysics as a science 'in itself' and 'for us'. In line with the theory of science in the
Lectura Parisiensis in which Duns Scotus casts theology as a strictly demonstrative science in
the present state (a scientia propter quid nobis) the Quaestio de cognitione Dei is seen to
demand that the same be allowed for metaphysics as well - its conception of metaphysics as a
scientia in se distinct from theology hence critically amends Scotus's conception of
metaphysics. This criticism not only shows that the Quaestio de cognitione Dei is wrongly
attributed to Duns Scotus and is rather to be situated in the innerfranciscan debate on his
Parisian theory of science in the second decade of the 14th century - in the direct environment
of John of Reading whose texts resonate in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei. This criticism also
incites further investigation into the singular character of Scotus's Parisian conception of
science as well as a reconsideration of the traditional interpretation of his metaphysics prey
to the systematic inconsistency the Quaestio de cognitione Dei denounces.
