The decades of the 1980s and 1990s represented the golden era of 'alternative security'
reflected politically in the idea of 'co-operative security' and militarily in proposals
concerning the adoption by states of 'non-offensive defence' strategies. Alternative security
aimed at addressing the political and military problems in Europe created by the East-West
confrontation. When the Cold War ended efforts were undertaken to apply the principles of
co-operative security and non-offensive defence in world regions other than Europe. However
political realities have prevented many states from adopting such policies and strategies. This
volume seeks to provide an empirical contribution to the existing literature on co-operative
security and non-offensive defence by focusing on the Greek-Turkish and the Arab-Israeli
conflicts. It argues that for states living in what has been called the 'zone of war' the
adoption of policies of co-operative security and non-offensive defence is highly unlikely and
to a considerable degree dangerous. A set of conditions is put forward as a prerequisite for
the acceptance and implementation of the above-mentioned policies by the states concerned. It
has been written in such a way that it can be used as a textbook by students or anyone else
interested in security analysis strategic studies and international relations. It has been
based on the idea that the three fields are so interconnected that any effort to examine an
issue in the light of only one of these fields may seriously distort reality. The book can also
be useful to those interested in the Greek-Turkish and the Arab-Israeli conflicts. It examines
not only the issues in dispute but most importantly it points to the 'strategic' logic which
underlines the policies and attitudes of the actors involved in these conflicts.
