These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions
Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA) held May 8-9 2009 in Boston Massachusetts
USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market
mechanism to solve a problem including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to
more traditional academic papers the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real
world including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the
synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and
game-theoretic issues the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired
outcomes and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical
applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer
scientists theorists and empiricists academics and practitioners. The program as reflected
in these proceedings ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical
design and analysis of matching mechanisms peer-to-peer-systems and prediction markets.
