India and Pakistan have been in a state of persistent conflict that goes back to the very
creation of these states after decolonization. This conflict has resulted in several wars and
continuing armed clashes. After both states became nuclear powers one would have expected a
fundamental change in the way they wage war since it is a fundamental principle of
International Relations theory that nuclear-armed states do not go to war with each other. But
the situation in South Asia seems to defy this principle. India's conventional superiority
should be neutralized by Pakistan's nuclear capability while Pakistan's risk-taking behavior
should be reduced. But as a matter of fact the situation has turned out quite differently:
Although large-scale conventional wars have not occurred the nuclear status seems to have
encouraged conflict and risk-taking. The number of armed clashes rose.Bluth and Mumtaz
scrutinize the atypical and seemingly paradoxical impact of nuclearization on theconflict
between India and Pakistan paying extra attention on the question of how stable this
paradoxical strategic relationship is. They demonstrate that the dominant paradigm used in the
International Relations literature is by far not adequate to explain the strategic relations
between India and Pakistan and set to work on developing a more coherent explanation. A
must-read for everyone interested in International Relations and conflict resolution research.
