In 2004 the United Nations Security Council initiated a Working Group on General Issues of
Sanctions in order to increase the Council s effectiveness in terms of sanctions
implementation. With this reform the Council reacted to the harsh criticism from the UN
against the conventional sanctions practice. It was the Security Council s latest endeavor to
make ratified sanctions more punitive coercive and thus effective as far as causing
compliance within its judicial framework is concerned. Summarized under the term smart
sanctions the Security Council tries to be more accurate in addressing sanctions thereby
seeking not only to increase political effectiveness but also to reduce unintended
humanitarian suffering. While conventional sanctions are comprehensive and comprised of a
variety of measures such as trade boycotts and embargoes against the entire country smart or
targeted sanctions (as they are also termed) are selective targeting only at certain areas or
individuals. Consequently sanctions are the practical expression of the Council s sovereignty.
The Council lives and breathes through the ratification of sanctions so their corroboration
and proper enforcement reflect the organization s vitality. In short if sanctions fail the
Council fails. So far scholars have accentuated technical questions in their research such as
how to engage in a successful bargaining process and how to imply isolation. They further
focused on examining the compliance rate of targeted states. What has been slightly ignored is
a potentially poor commitment by states to enforce sanctions in the first place. Quite possibly
the Security Council lacks ratification (what I term input legitimacy) and enforcement (what I
term output legitimacy) of smart sanctions. Consequently the effectiveness of smart sanctions
does not necessarily have to be linked to the compliance rate of the targeted state. Instead
it might be connected to the commitment shown by the enforcing member states: the level of
legitimacy granted to the Council and its tools. Two questions can be raised: How do member
states contribute to the ratification and enforcement of smart sanctions? Has the use of smart
sanctions increased the effectiveness of the UNSC as a sanctioning body? The concept of input
output legitimacy serves as a model for analyzing the member states commitment and will to
impose smart sanctions thus developing an alternative understanding of the term effectiveness
. As the cases of Iran and North-Korea reveal the ratification and enforcement of smart
sanctions suffer legitimacy. This has ramifications both theoretically and empirically as it
makes the concept of legitimacy a valuable tool for policy makers and reformists while
simultaneously exposing substantial weaknesses of the new sanction practice.
