Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is in urgent need of reform. The Euro crisis has
exposed this need in a dramatic and unprecedented fashion. Yet crisis reactions on behalf of
Eurozone policy-makers have been piecemeal and hesitant instead of constituting effective
reforms capable of remedying the weaknesses of the EMU's system of governance. This book
compiled by five scholars of the University of Hamburg provides an in-depth analysis of the
flaws of Eurozone governance by means of an innovative analytical framework based on fiscal
federalism theory and game theory further enriched by insights of theories of democratic
legitimation. Its major focus is on understanding Eurozone governance as the provision of
different types of public goods each of which requires an adequate governmental structure. The
study is enhanced by lessons from historical developments in currency unification in the US and
in Canada which help to put the Eurozone's woes into perspective. On the whole this book may
serve as a comprehensive guide for policy-makers scholars and all others interested in finding
a long-term solution to preserving and stabilizing the Eurozone.
