The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is usually overlooked in
the literature on the Cold War and presented as the seal of détente. The Final Act came to be
considered as the mere official recognition of the European balance for the sake of a
fictitious dialogue and vague statements on the freer circulation of ideas people and
information. The emerging human rights movements in Eastern Europe then came as the
unintentional consequence of a complete diplomatic and political failure. It is the opinion of
the author that the West neither limited its action to a passive acceptance of a long-sponsored
Soviet proposal nor sold out half a continent. The author carefully traces back the roots of
the CSCE and argues that the Helsinki conference was also the result of the development in
Western positions and a thoroughly conceived action especially as far as the EC member states
were concerned. She analyses the internal dynamics of the Western caucus and reveals the
divergences on ideas attitudes and goals that emerged between the United States and the
European allies. In such a connection the author argues that the Hague Summit and the creation
of the European Political Cooperation gave a boost to an active role of the EC states and the
starting of serious pan-European talks. The author offers not only a thorough analysis of the
Western experience at Helsinki but also new seminal interpretations in the fields of Cold War
history transatlantic relations and the history of the European integration. By examining and
reconciling all these aspects in a common context this book contributes to more complete
understanding of both détente and the CSCE.
