Empathy is a term used increasingly both in moral theory and animal ethics with the suggestion
that empathy enhances our moral ability and agency. Yet its precise meaning is often left
unexplored together with the various obstacles and challenges met by an empathy-based ethic
such as those concerning the ways in which empathy is prone to bias and may also facilitate
manipulation of others. These oversights render the contemporary discussion on empathy and
animal ethics vulnerable to both conceptual confusion and moral simplicity. The book aims to
tackle these problems by clarifying the different and even contradictory ways in which empathy
can be defined and by exploring the at times surprising implications the various definitions
have from the viewpoint of moral agency. Its main question is: What types of empathy hinder
moral ability and what types enable us to become more morally capable in our dealings with the
nonhuman world? During the contemporary era when valuable forms of empathy are in decline and
the more hazardous self-regarding and biased varieties of utilising empathy in the increase
this question is perhaps more important than ever.
