Representationalism grasps the meaning and grammar of linguistic expressions in terms of
reference that is as determined by the respective objects concepts or states of affairs they
are supposed to represent and by the internal structure of the content they articulate. As a
consequence the semantic and grammatical properties of linguistic expressions allegedly
reflect the constitution of the objects they refer to. Questions concerning the meaning of
particular linguistic expressions are supposed to be answerable by investigating the
metaphysics of the corresponding phenomena. Accordingly questions of the meaning of
psychological concepts are turned into questions of the nature of psychological states.
Concerned with Moore's Paradox representationalist approaches lead into an investigation of
the state of affairs supposedly described by Moore-paradoxical assertions and thus eventually
into investigations concerning the metaphysics of belief.This book argues that this strategy
necessarily yields both a wrong solution to Moore's Paradox and an inadequate conception of the
meaning of the expression I believe. Turning to the metaphysics of belief is of no use when it
comes to understanding either the meaning of the expression 'I believe' or the logic of avowals
of belief. Instead it proposes to focus on the role they play in language the ways in which
they are used in practice.
