This work addresses stealthy peripheral-based attacks on host computers and presents a new
approach to detecting them. Peripherals can be regarded as separate systems that have a
dedicated processor and dedicated runtime memory to handle their tasks. The book addresses the
problem that peripherals generally communicate with the host via the host's main memory
storing cryptographic keys passwords opened files and other sensitive data in the process -
an aspect attackers are quick to exploit.Here stealthy malicious software based on isolated
micro-controllers is implemented to conduct an attack analysis the results of which provide
the basis for developing a novel runtime detector. The detector reveals stealthy
peripheral-based attacks on the host's main memory by exploiting certain hardware properties
while a permanent and resource-efficient measurement strategy ensures that the detector is also
capable of detecting transient attacks which can otherwise succeed when the applied strategy
only measures intermittently. Attackers exploit this strategy by attacking the system in
between two measurements and erasing all traces of the attack before the system is measured
again.