Legal paternalism is the theory that the state may legitimately interfere with its citizens by
obligations and bans in order to benefit them for their own good. Typically such measures
infringe the citizens' autonomy since the state imposes principles on them about what is good
or bad. Alternatively individualists argue that persons may well decide for themselves what
endeavors are favorable or dangerous. In the present book the theory of paternalism is applied
to specific state policies: nudges. Nudges are influences of individuals' choices by making use
of certain cognitive tendencies like biases routines or laziness while at the same time
preserving the person's freedom of choice. The pressing question emerges to what extent these
liberty-preserving nudges can nevertheless infringe people's autonomy and thus be
paternalistic. The analysis may have far-reaching consequences. Morally objectionable
infringements of autonomy could be discovered anti-individualist policies could be revealed
and effective legal protection could be endangered. While bringing together paternalism and
nudging such questions are raised in the present book.
