For the positive experience with tying progress in negotiations with progress in reform in
Central and Eastern Europe the European Union made its membership offer to the Western Balkans
countries conditional on specific democratic principles most notably (full) cooperation with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Yet although EU
membership is regarded as highly attractive both for political elites and the general public in
the region the erratic record of compliance with ICTY-related EU conditionality in Croatia
since 2000 raises questions about the EU's ability to provide for rule transfer' and norm
diffusion' in the current enlargement round and poses a puzzle to scholars of international
relations and EU enlargement alike. My findings suggest that EU conditionality was rather
inconsistently applied toward Croatia. Two main conclusions can be made from this. First
individual member states have gained in influence over enlargement policy that leads to a more
politicized use of the conditionality tool undermining its effectiveness. Second it
illustrates the need to place politics in time and to go beyond purely rationalist
explanations.
