It is commonly believed that people in certain circumstances possess a right to self-defense.
This exists not only on an individual but also on a collective level historically known as
Just War Theory. During the 20th century this theory has undergone a revival in academic
circles mainly due to the invention of nuclear weaponry the cold war and America's military
involvement in Vietnam. Yet many of the assumptions of the Just War Theory have been
challenged and undergone a revision and a separate school of thought has emerged: the
revisionist just war theorists. A core feature of their philosophy is viewing war as the
continuation of different forms of conflict such as self-defense. The moral justification for
war needs to therefore stem from the same source of morality. This book is about the
philosophical debate on the moral basis for self-defense. The accounts of two main protagonists
in the field Judith Jarvis Thomson and Jeff McMahan are outlined. The former takes a
rights-based approach to self-defense the latter a responsibility-based one. Subsequently the
author develops his own account which is a partial synthesis between the former two albeit
remaining a responsibility-based one at its core. He introduces the conceptual differentiation
between perspectives into the fundamental level of justification which gives rise to a
separate supplementary criterion. The author also addresses the points of criticism raised
against the former two accounts and shows how his own is better equipped in responding to the
challenges raised against McMahan's responsibility-based account.
