This book introduces an analytic framework constructed upon the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma
game to model and analyze transboundary water interactions along the Nile River. It presents a
thorough and in-depth analysis of the historical path through which conflict and cooperation
have been generated among the Nile riparians over large-scale developmental schemes. This is
done through modeling water interactions in the basin as an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game
and employing process-tracing method to compare four distinguishable rounds of the game: the
colonial round the Cold War round the post-Cold War round and the post-2011 round. The book
examines the influences of the changing political contexts at the domestic regional and
global levels on the game outcomes. This framework is initially applied on several cases of
international rivers worldwide while the rest of the book is devoted to the Nile case. The
book's central argument is that the riparians' interests capabilities and beliefs are
heterogeneous in varying degrees and that the changing multilevel political contexts influence
the level of such heterogeneities among the riparians which ultimately drive the equilibrium
dynamics in the Nile game to generate different conflictive and cooperative outcomes over time.
Although the book's main conclusion indicates that the absence of economic interdependence and
regional integration will transfer the game into tug-of-war which will impose harsh punishment
on the basin communities and ecosystems on the long term the final chapter lists a group of
recommendations addressed to the riparian states and international donors exploring the way
for boosting cooperation and preventing conflicts in the basin. Presenting clear theoretical
methodological and policy implications this book is appropriate for students and scholars of
international relations hydrology and development studies.
