Throughout human history there may hardly be found any other single decision that still causes
such high amounts of scholarly debate as does the dropping of Atomic Bombs upon the Japanese
city of Hiroshima in August 6th 1945 and respectively three days later upon the city of
Nagasaki. These events have caused close to 100 000 casualties in the civilian population and
yet it does not include all of those persons who would later succumb to radiation sickness or
severe birth deformations. Historians still debate the alleged plurality of motives underlying
this momentous decision. The debate's result is a polarized scholarly discord which by now
virtually abounds in a multitude of different theories and competing suppositions. On the one
hand there are those scholars who argue that the decision rested solely on grounds of military
expediency foremost on the necessity to shorten a gruelling war and to save the lives of
American soldiers. On the other hand historians offer the explanation that American policy
makers above all wanted to exhibit their country's enormous military potency and therefore
Hiroshima and Nagasaki should demonstrate the vast destructive potential which presently solely
the United States had at its command and so counter post-war ambitions of the Soviet Union.
The author of this study analyses the contextual circumstances in the spring and summer of 1945
and moreover the principal motives of the key American government officials. Accordingly the
author offers his own substantive and conclusive answer to the question that concerns the
primary factors and or ostensibly ulterior motives that led American decision makers to issue
the consequential order to detonate Atomic Bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First and
foremost the findings rest upon a critical and comprehensive engagement and are based on the
available documentary evidence from this time.
